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The Legal Environment
The legal environment surrounding the unionization of library personnel
must be discussed from several different standpoints. At the outset, one must
differentiate among library personnel on the basis of whom they work for.
library personnel working for private universities come under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Library personnel working for public employers
in some states come under the jurisdiction of a state public employee labor
relations act, while such personnel in other states have no statutory protection
and must rely on judge-made law which varies from state to state.
For many years library personnel were in the no-man's land of labor
relations, outside the reach of any statutory framework to guide them in their
dealings with their employer. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
had refused to assert jurisdiction over private, nonprofit colleges and uni-
versities until 1970, when in its Cornell University (183 NLRB 41) decision it
decided to assert jurisdiction over such institutions.
Library personnel working for public employers are not under the
jurisdiction of the NLRA. As public employees, they have been slow to
achieve many of the rights which have long been enjoyed by employees in the
private sector. Since a large number of library personnel work in the public
sector, it is important to provide some background with respect to public
sector bargaining.
When we consider public employee bargaining from a historical per-
spective, we are not talking of bargaining but rather of the restraints imposed
in preventing union organization and bargaining from ever taking place. Nearly
two decades ago, the report of the American Bar Association Committee on
Labor Relations of Governmental Employees suggested that: "a government
which imposes upon other employers certain obligations in dealing with their
employees may not in good faith refuse to deal with its own public servants
on a reasonably similar basis, modified, of course, to meet the exigencies of
the public service."
1
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At the time of that report it was generally accepted that public
employees did not have any right to bargain. Indeed, in 1945 the Supreme
Court had occasion to note that "under customary practices government
employees do not bargain collectively with their employer."
2
A central rationale leading to the denial of bargaining rights in the
public sector was the concept of sovereignty. Since collective bargaining is
premised on a bilateral determination of conditions of employment, it was
viewed as an interference in the sovereign's affairs. Typical of the attitude
which prevailed is the opinion of the Florida Attorney General in 1944 in
which he stated: "no organization, regardless of who it is affiliated with, union
or non-union, can tell a political subdivision possessing the attributes of
sovereignty, who it can employ, how much it shall pay them, or any other
matter relating to its employees. To countenance such a proposition would be
to surrender a portion of sovereignty that is possessed by every municipal
corporation."
3
During the same time that bargaining rights were being denied, certain
groups of public employees were thwarted even in their efforts to organize.
Various courts sustained discharges of public employees for becoming
members of labor unions on the grounds that such membership either violated
a state statute or the court's perception of state public policy.
It is of some interest to note that public employees were on several
occasions granted the right to organize on the basis of a state right-to-work
law. In a reversal of the popular concept of their role, some courts construed
state right-to-work laws as allowing public employees the right to organize and
join labor unions.
4
Until recently, and even now with rare exception, public employees have
been denied the right to strike. In enjoining strikes, courts noted the need for
government services to be unobstructed and held that such strikes contravene
public welfare.
5
Historically, courts have generally been either disinclined or compelled
to analyze at length the basis for enjoining public employee strikes. A finding
that such strikes result in a denial of government authority seems to reflect
the conclusion that strikes compel governmental decisions that would other-
wise not be made.
Many of the decisions prohibiting public employee strikes have arisen in
states which have "Little Norris-LaGuardia Acts" prohibiting the issuance of
injunctions in labor disputes. Even in the absence of express exclusion,
however, these anti-injunction statues have not been held applicable to public
employees.
6
While the role of the law in the past has been a negative factor with
respect to public employee bargaining, significant changes have occurred over
the past fifteen years. Federal courts have recognized the constitutional rights
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of public employees to join and form labor unions and have struck down
statues prohibiting public employees from joining unions.
7
Federal and state
courts have also become increasingly sensitive to the due process rights of
public employees.
In more than thirty-six states and in the federal government the debate
over the legitimacy of public employee organizational and bargaining rights is
academic as a result of legislation or executive order. The public sector
bargaining legislation which has been enacted raises numerous issues which
have no analogy to the private sector. While space does not permit discussion
of all of these issues, some of the present approaches to public employee
bargaining deserve mention.
It is often suggested that one of the distinguishing features between the
private and public sectors is that in the private sector management and unions
negotiate under the constraints of the market place. Management in the
private sector considers the effects of increased labor costs on the price of
items being manufactured as well as competitive forces and consumer pref-
erence. In the public sector, however, services are not generally dependent on
the revenues they produce and most often are exclusive in nature. This does
not mean, however, that the constraints found are no less effective than those
in the private sector.
It is the political process which imposes some of the major constraints
in the public sector. The type of service provided, the location where such
services are to be provided, and the allocation of revenue to provide such
services is often dependent upon political opinion and political pressures.
Thus, it has been argued, opening the door to full-scale bargaining, as has
evolved in the private sector, will "institutionalize the power of public
employee unions in a way that would leave competing groups in the political
process at a permanent and substantial disadvantage."
8
In applying these views, some states and the federal government have
chosen to limit the scope of bargaining by executive order. Thus, in some
states public employers are not required to bargain over matters of "inherent
managerial policy," including "the functions and programs of the public
employer, standards of services [and] standards of work." Other states such as
Michigan have not chosen to limit the duty to bargain, however, and have
imposed a duty similar to that imposed under the NLRA.
In addition to the impact of the political process on defining the scope
of bargaining, another factor which has played a significant role is the
presence of civil service systems. In many states and municipalities, civil
service systems have come to encompass all aspects of employee relations and
not just those aspects related to the merit principle. In Illinois, for example,
the personnel code and its implementing rules cover most of the matters
found in private sector collective bargaining agreements.
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Unfortunately, many states have ignored the pervasive impact of civil
service statutes and rules in drafting public sector bargaining legislation. The
failure to deal adequately with this issue leads ultimately to judicial accommo-
dationa solution ill suited to treat fully the complexities presented.
9
Another issue which has not been fully considered in drafting public
sector legislation is the definition of who the public employer really is. Is it
the executive branch, or does that title belong to the legislature or a county
board which ultimately approves the monetary terms of any ageement through
the appropriation process?
Very little attention has been given to this issue which bears directly on
the implementation of a statutory duty to bargain in good faith. One state
which has at least addressed itself to this problem is Wisconsin. Under the
Wisconsin Public Employee Relations Act, the term employer is defined to
reflect the differences between the legislative and executive branches. While
the state is considered as a single employer, the act sets out the role of the
legislature with respect to the implementation and approval of collective
bargaining agreements.
One of the critical issues faced in the public sector is the determination
of appropriate bargaining units. While Martin Schneid discusses this issue in
depth elsewhere in this volume, it is necessary for me to touch upon some of
the problems posed.
Bargaining unit determinations in the public sector have far-reaching
consequences since the establishment of a given unit affects the structure of
bargaining and has a measurable impact on the traditional governmental policy
of maintaining, where possible, uniformity of terms and conditions of employ-
ment.
Unit determinations in states which do not have legislation are made
either by the parties or by the employer. For example, in Chicago High
School Assistant Principals Association v. Board of Education of the City of
Chicago the court was faced with the issue of whether the Board of Education
had to recognize high school assistant principals as a separate unit for pur-
poses of collective bargaining. Assistant principals were covered under the
Board of Education's collective bargaining agreement with the Chicago
Teachers Union. The agreement contained no provision for the severance of
assistant principals and the board refused to recognize this group as a separate
unit. In supporting the board's action, the court noted that it was "clear
[that] the Board wanted to deal with just one bargaining unit" and that if
each of the groups covered under the contract "were allowed to carve out its
own bargaining unit, the extended negotiation would work an undue hardship
on the Board in carrying out its necessary public purpose."
1
The absence of criteria to govern unit determinations generally brought
about a proliferation of units since public employers and state legislatures gave
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little consideration to this issue. For example, in New York City more than 380
separate units were established some containing as few as two employees.
Similar patterns were found under Executive Order 10988, in Wisconsin,
Massachusetts and Oregon.
Among the factors most frequently mentioned in determining bargaining
units are: (1) clear and identifiable community of interest among employees;
(2) establishment of units which will promote effective collective bargaining;
and (3) establishment of units in light of the operational efficiency of the
agency or agencies involved. In addition to these general considerations,
numerous states have now imposed explicit criteria to deal with the problem
of fragmented bargaining units.
When dealing with state employees, legislatures have been even more
explicit in terms of unit determinations. The Pennsylvania act requires the
board to consider "that when the Commonwealth is the employer, it will be
bargaining on a statewide basis unless issues involve work conditions peculiar
to a given governmental locale."
1 1 The Illinois Executive Order covering state
employees requires the office of collective bargaining to "promote the interest
of the State in bargaining on a statewide basis by considering statewide units
presumptively appropriate."
1 2
Similarly, the Minnesota act draws a distinction
between municipal employees and state employees by requiring the director of
mediation services to "define appropriate units of state employees as all the
employees under the same appointing authority except where professional,
geographical or other considerations affecting employment relations clearly
require appropriate units of some other composition."
1 3
The trend toward statewide units is not uniform. Several states have
found separate units appropriate in cases involving educational institutions.
For example, in Ft. Hays Kansas State College, the Kansas Public Employee
Relations Board stated that it "would allow public employees at each unit of
higher education to organize an individual institutional unit."
14
In discussing
the rational of its decision the board noted:
Each institution, we feel, is a separate distinct operating entity with a
complex relationship already existing between the public employees and
the administration therein. The principles of efficient administration will
be maintained inasmuch as the evidence before this board indicates that
most problems concerning conditions of employment with university
employees have been handled on a local basis; i.e., between the local
university administration and the employee. . . . Some previous history
of employee organization, specifically KU Medical Center, was noted but
not considered as having great weight. However, geographical location
posed a possible serious problem, especially when considered with the
concept of the separate identity of each institution as mentioned above.
The difficulties of employees organizing over a great distance (i.e., the
distance between Wichita and Fort Hays) when considered in light of
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the fact that each institution has operated as a separate identity made
the unit determinations on an individual basis seem most logical. The
board did not view the problems of overfragmentation and splintering of
a work force as automatically requiring a statewide unit in every case,
but that each case must be reviewed on its own merit, thus our decision
of the individual institutional units.
1 5
The above approach can be contrasted with the approach taken in New
York and New Jersey. The New York board held that a university-wide
faculty bargaining unit was appropriate since "the concomitant differences
among the campuses do not establish such conflicts of interest between their
respective professions as to warrant geographic fragmentation."
16 A similar
result was reached by the New Jersey commission when it reversed its earlier
determination that separate units were appropriate.
1 7
Recently the director of public employment practices and representation
of the New York Public Employment Relations Board was faced with a
decertification petition on behalf of nonacademic professionals who were in a
statewide unit combined with academic professionals.
18 The nonacademic
professionals sought separate representation and a reversal of the board's
earlier decision including academic and nonacademic professionals in a state-
wide unit. The director of public employment practices and representation
held that there was no evidence to justify fragmenting the existing bargaining
unit and found that the history of collective bargaining which existed after
the establishment of the initial unit demonstrated that nonacademic profes-
sionals "did enjoy effective and meaningful negotiations on salaries as well as
other matters." 1 9
Even where a single campus is held to constitute an appropriate unit,
questions arise with respect to the composition of that unit. In 1972 the
Pennsylvania Public Employee Relations Board held that the faculty members
in the university's law, dental and medical schools should be excluded from an
overall unit and directed an election in the law school unit.20 The Michigan
Employment Relations Commission, however, rejected the establishment of
separate units within a given institution and rejected the establishment of a
separate medical school unit on the grounds that "it would unduly frag-
mentize a teaching faculty unit if individual schools or colleges are permitted
to have separate representation."
2 1
It is evident from the decisions rendered by state public employee
relations boards that the trend is toward large units, particularly when dealing
with state employees. It is obvious that the early problems faced in New York
and Wisconsin have greatly influenced subsequent action with respect to unit
determinations. The trend toward large units does not preclude the establish-
ment of separate institutional units as evidenced by the Minnesota and Kansas
decisions affecting state colleges and universities.
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The trend toward large units is also evident from the National Labor
Relations Board decisions concerning university employees. For example, at
New York University in 1973 the board noted that while librarians were
distinguished from faculty members with respect to tenure requirements,
retirement age and lack of proportional representation on the university
senate, they should be included in a university-wide unit with faculty
members.22 While in several cases the board has rejected units composed
solely of library personnel, it did find a separate unit appropriate at Clare-
mont University in 1972.
23
In contrasting some of the rights granted employees under the National
Labor Relations Act and the rights of public sector employees, we can first
look at the whole concept of collective bargaining. In the private sector, a
fundamental premise of national labor relations policy is the concept of free
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining has long been viewed as a process
by which parties settle disputes without the intervention of a third party. The
strike or threat of a strike plays a fundamental role in the private sector since
it is the threat of something worse which is viewed as a means to secure
agreement between an employer and a union. Thus, federal courts have
prohibited state interference with the collective bargaining process.
In the public sector the concept of free collective bargaining has really
never surfaced since, with rare exception, public employees are denied the right
to strike. Impasse resolution devices in the public sector are viewed as the means
to bringing about the settlement of a dispute between two unyielding parties.
The reasons given for denying public employees the right to strike are
varied. According to some, the acceptance of the right of public employees to
strike would take away the authority of public officials to administer govern-
ment for people. President Roosevelt had occasion to observe that "a strike of
public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to
obstruct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied."
24
The Taylor Committee in New York stated that the right to strike in the
public sector is not compatible with orderly functioning of a democratic form
of representative government.
The future, in my opinion, will bring about a re-evaluation of the
traditional notion that all public employees should be barred from striking. It
is obvious that certain governmental services are essential and must be pro-
vided. This does not mean, however, that free collective bargaining with the
concomitant presence of economic force cannot exist in certain areas. Indeed,
one should consider whether the public is paying a higher cost by denying all
public employees the right to strike and substituting for that right impasse
resolution devices which might reflect higher settlements than would have
been achieved had the test been one of economic warfare rather than third-
party decision-making.
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Moreover, declaring public employee strikes illegal has not meant the
end of strikes. States which have enacted punitive antistrike legislation have
often had to forego enforcement of the law since the penalties were too
extreme. This was particularly true in New York under the Condon-Wadlin
Act.
The failure to enforce stringent laws regarding public employee strikes is
further evidence of the deep political involvement in public sector collective
bargaining. A governor or mayor is both an employer and politician. These
roles are not consistent since a chief executive's actions as an employer carry
political overtones. Thus, in New York it was shown that the Condon-Wadlin
Act was not enforced in cases where the striking union was politically
strong.
2 5
In considering whether public employees should be granted the right to
strike, one should also focus on the question of what issues are appropriate
for strike action. There has been little consideration of this question since
most states prohibit public employee strikes and even in the states providing a
limited right to strike no distinction is made over the issues on which strike
action can be taken.
An example of this problem is a decision of an agency to go from a
program of providing institutional care to the utilization of private facilities.
Some of the groups affected by such a decision are the employees at the state
institution, the patients being treated, the municipality where the institution is
located and special interest groups involved in the health care field. While a
union representing the employees should be able to bargain with the public
employer over the impact of such a decision, one can persuasively argue that
decisions such as this should not be subjects over which unions can strike.
To remove an issue which might affect a broad range of social and
community interests from the arena of economic warfare is not to say that
public employees and their bargaining representatives should not have input
with respect to that issue. Bargaining and political pressure, a tool used by
public employee unions and other interest groups, offer ways in which the
public employee can participate in the decision-making process.
Another troublesome issue in the public sector concerns union security
agreements. As an exclusive representative, a union must represent, without
discrimination, all employees in the unit regardless of union affiliation. In the
private sector union security agreements are legal, except in states where
right-to-work laws are in effect. Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees the
right to organize and bargain collectively and the right to refrain from such
activities
"except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in Section 8(aX3)."
2 6
In NLRB v. General Motors, the Supreme Court discussed the
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differences between an agency shop and a union shop in the following terms:
"Under the second proviso to 8(a)(3), the burdens of membership upon
which employment may be conditioned are expressly limited to the payment
of initiation fees and monthly dues. It is permissible to condition employment
upon membership, but membership insofar as it has significance to em-
ployment rights, may in turn be conditioned only on payment of fees and
dues. 'Membership' as a condition of employment is whittled down to its
financial core."
27
Thus, the distinction between union shop and agency shop
is the choice of membership. Under an agency shop the employee is given the
"option of membership" while under a union shop, that option is removed.
Recently the NLRB held that the term "membership" in Section 8(aX3)
means "a financial obligation limited to payment of fees and dues."
28
The primary challenge to negotiating agency shop or union shop clauses
in the public sector centered around the provisions in various state laws giving
employees the right to refrain from union activity. In the private sector, this
question has arisen within the context of right-to-work laws.
In 1963 the Florida Supreme Court held that a clause requiring the
payment of service fees as a condition of employment was violative of the
right-to-work section of the Florida Constitution.
29 The court based its
decision on the fact that an individual's
"right to work" without regard to
union membership was "abridged" when the individual was required to pay a
fee to continue working.
A contrary view of a right-to-work provision is found in Meade Electric
Co. v. Hagberg. There, the court held that the Indiana right-to-work law did
not bar negotiation of agency shop since the statute "merely prohibits agree-
ments and conduct which conditions employment on membership in a labor
organization."
30
Membership, however, under the NLRB's rationale is the
payment of fees and dues. Thus, one should question the rationale employed
by the court in Hagberg.
Various decisions have been rendered in the public sector concerning the
legality of agency shop clauses. In New Jersey Turnpike Employees, Local 194
v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, a New Jersey court was faced with the
task of determining whether such a clause was permissible in light of the
following statutory provision: "Public employees shall have, and shall be
protected in the exercise of, the right to freely and without fear of penalty or
reprisal, to form, join and assist any employee organization or to refrain from
such activity."
31
In interpreting the above language, the court held that the execution of
an agency shop agreement violated an employee's right to refrain from
assisting an employee organization. Relying on the right of employees to
refrain from
"assisting" an employee organization, the court concluded that
the enforcement of an agency shop clause would have the effect of "inducing,
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if not compelling, union membership, participation, and assistance on the part
of non-member employees."
3 2
Similarly, in Monroe-Woodbury Teachers Assn. the New York Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) held that an agency shop clause was
illegal. In reaching its decision the New York board relied on several factors.
First, it found that an "agency shop ... is inconsistent with the statutory
grant of right that employees may refrain from 'participating in' an employee
organization."
33
In addition, the Public Employment Relations Board found
that the negotiation of an agency shop clause was in conflict with the New
York Teachers Tenure Act and the New York dues deduction law.
On appeal the PERB's holding was affirmed. The Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court found that to require the payment of dues
"would be in violation of the law as constituting, at the very least, partici-
pation in an employee organization."
34 The court also held that the nego-
tiation of an agency shop was inconsistent with the provisions of the New
York Public Employee Relations Act, which makes it unlawful to "dis-
criminate against any employee for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging
membership in, or participation in the activities of any employee
organization."
35
In Illinois, the Attorney General has issued a recent opinion which has
held that employees of a county highway department cannot be required to
join a union should the county board recognize and bargain with the union as
the exclusive representative of the highway department employees. In addi-
tion, the Attorney General held that union dues can be deducted only if the
employee requests to have this done. In light of these opinions and the
current state law, the union security issue in Illinois can only be resolved
through legislative action.
Some of the issues present in both the public and private sector with
respect to the unionization of librarians concern the status of librarians as
professional employees and their role as supervisors. The National Labor
Relations Board has considered librarians to be professionals and have there-
fore included them in units with other faculty members. The board has also
rejected the argument that the supervision of nonprofessional personnel by
librarians automatically makes them supervisors so as to deny them bargaining
rights. The board considers the amount of time that librarians spend super-
vising and the group which is supervised.
In discussing the legal environment, it is important to point out that
various changes are currently being proposed which would affect library
personnel. Several bills are now pending in Congress to either extend NLRA
coverage to public employees or to create a national public employee relations
act. The wisdom of having federal legislation cover public employees is in
doubt since there are great differences among states which must be considered
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in drafting and enacting any public employee relations bill. It seems better to
deal with this issue on a state rather than a federal level, even though it might
be necessary to set some minimum federal standards which states are required
to meet.
Until there is legislation in states like Illinois, the great majority of
library personnel have to depend on judge-made law which is an inadequate
means to solve the major problems posed in this area. In the absence of a
statutory framework, courts are ill equipped to deal with the myriad of issues
raised in this area.
The current labor relations scene in Illinois represents a patchwork of
thoughts and ideas, most of which are confusing and not very meaningful.
Other than Executive Order 6, which Illinois Governor Daniel Walker issued in
September 1973, there is no framework to guide labor relations for public
employees in that state.
The legal environment surrounding the unionization of library personnel
illustrates the difference between the public and private sectors. While
librarians in the private sector can negotiate virtually all matters, their public
sector counterparts are generally not given such a generous menu to negotiate.
While librarians in the private sector can strike, their public sector counter-
parts are generally denied recourse to this tool of economic warfare. But while
librarians in the private sector must rely on the economic force they can
generate to bring about a settlement, their public sector counterparts can
often rely on impasse resolution devices to solve differences.
To this already confusing environment we add the fact that the rights of
librarians in the public sector may often vary from employer to employer.
The situation will not become any clearer until legislation is passed which
establishes a basic framework to protect employers, employees and the public.
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